Iraq's policy of deception

Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having a large, effective, system for hiding

proscribed material including documentation, components, production

equipment and possibly biological and chemical agents and weapons from

the UN.  Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an

Administrative Security Committee (ASC) was formed with responsibility

for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to

UNSCOM and the IAEA.  The Committee consisted of senior Military

Industrial Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq's weapons of mass

destruction programmes.  The Higher Security Committee (HSC) of the

Presidential Office was in overall command of deception operations.  The

system was directed from the very highest political levels within the

Presidential Office and involved, if not Saddam himself, his youngest son,

Qusai.  The system for hiding proscribed material relies on high mobility and

good command and control.  It uses lorries to move items at short notice and

most hide sites appear to be located close to good road links and

telecommunications.  The Baghdad area was particularly favoured.  In

addition to active measures to hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted

to monitor, delay and collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall

deception plan.

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