The new party system which emerged in the 1980s was broader and more representative than in the past

and potentially more capable of aggregating and articulating the interests of a larger and more socially

diverse electorate.  There were four main parties in the 1980s: the center left populist APRA, the center 

right populist Accion Popular, the right of center PPC, and the socialist United Left coalition. Each party

governed or shared power sometime in the 1980s. Each was troubled with acute internal divisions and by

the predominance of short term electoral objectives over the establishment of lasting party structures and

constituency building. Furthermore, they all seemed incapable of governing effectively.

In was in this context that independent candidate Alberto Fujimori came to power with a platform that

was critical of political parties, proposing to replace them with more a efficient Executive and with

mechanisms of  direct democracy  linking the President directly with the masses.

7

 This proposal

resonated with the electorate, and since 1992 the government has attempted to carry it out by changing

the structures of congressional representation, electoral rules, and oversight mechanisms.

Peru's party system today is characterized by the predominance of independent political movements that

are largely transitory in nature, organized around the electoral candidacies of personalist leaders

(generally  outsiders  and nontraditional politicians in the Fujimori mold) rather than specific ideologies

or government programs.  In the 2000 elections there are 10 different congressional lists and nine

presidential candidates, and those leading in the polls are new, rather than established, parties. Fujimori

himself has not established a permanent party, opting instead to form new political ones for each

electoral campaign.

The political party system thus involves three sets of actors and interests.

8

  The first group, involving

President Fujimori and his supporters, depends almost entirely on the use of public agencies and

resources to retain popular support. As this group has neither been able or willing to organize a lasting

political organization with bases in society, keeping Fujimori in power is fundamental for its survival.

Hence, their willingness to bend the rules in order to win the elections of 2000.

The second group is composed of the so called  traditional  parties (APRA, AP, PPC, and what remains

of the socialist left). Their main interest is in sheer political survival. They have turned inward, focusing

on cultivating their remaining traditional support bases, hampering their ability to join forces in broader

coalitions around common objectives. For the most part, these parties have displayed a lack of internal

democracy, leadership turnover, or new political messages.  This, combined with an inability to propose

convincing economic and social policy alternatives, has led to their persistent political marginalization.

In fact, in the 2000 election the PPC did not participate at all because it could not get the minimum

signatures needed to registar with the JNE, and AP lost its registration as a result of the 2000 contest

because it did not reach the minimum number of votes required to maintain its standing as an official

political party.

The third set of actors are the emergent  independent  movements vying to replace Fujimori, including

Per  Posible, Somos Per , Solidaridad Nacional, Avancemos,

 and other contenders at the national and

municipal levels. These movements, usually created around the candidacy of a popular figure, are

sustained by the mass media and shifting citizen preferences as transmitted by public opinion polls. Their

7

 The rise of independent candidates preceded Fujimori, with the election of popular television personality Ricardo

Belmont as Mayor of Lima in 1989.

8

 This characterization of the party system draws on the work of political scientist Martin Tanaka,

 Los partidos

politicos en el Peru , 1992 1999 

, IEP Working Paper No. 108, noviembre 1999.

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