little detail has been provided on the nature of rights necessary to achieve a desired behavioral 

response.  Often in return for the right to capture the benefit stream, rights are attached to 

responsibilities which, if not respected, will attract material disincentives or penalties. 

The concept of material incentives and disincentives may be easily understood but may not be 

the most appropriate solution for changing behavior in Indonesia.  Two important characteristics 

lead to this conclusion.  First, the cost of obtaining and protecting a right in Indonesia is likely to 

be extremely high at worst and uncertain at best.  The reason for this uncertainty is due to the 

second characteristic, which is lack of duty or responsibility associated with many existing 

Indonesian rights.  The concept of duty, in this case, refers to an individual's rights in which "one 

has the expectation that in both the law and in practice one s claim will be respected by those 

with a duty" (Bromley 1989).  The cost of ensuring that the duty is adhered to may be very high, 

especially when the costs have to be borne solely by an individual right holder and the 

defendant is either a large corporation, a number of other right holders, or a politically 

connected individual.  Rights become meaningless when the cost of enforcement exceeds the 

value of the right.  Donors also appear to be unwilling to incorporate emphasis on enforcement 

in their investment project designs, even though enforcement has resulted in significant 

improvements in some cases (Pet and Djohanni 1996). 

Material incentives have a significant weakness, primarily from their vulnerability to influences 

from external sources (e.g., the fluctuating market prices of fish, cloves, ulin   a type of 

hardwood used for roofing shingles, or seaweed).  This vulnerability means that  resource 

friendly behaviors  can easily be reversed through new incentives driven by changes in market 

prices.  Most material incentives have not appeared to yield durable behavior change.  Although 

there exist some examples where durable behavior change has occurred, they appear to be the 

exception to the rule (Wells 1997). 

Social pressure and material disincentives may be just as reliable for changing human 

behaviors as are material incentives.  Social pressure tends to be more significant for small 

groups or individuals than are material disincentives, which apply to a more universal target 

group.  Material disincentives face other problems with respect to durability of change.  Lack of 

durability is due to the dynamic nature of prices that can rapidly change.  Material disincentives 

are often defined within slow legal processes such that many sanctions become irrelevant.  As a 

result, large disincentives are often established to avoid the need to constantly revise them 

within the same legal processes.  Large disincentives have been shown to create the opposite 

effect of increasing the desire for a forbidden alternative (Brehm and Brehm 1981). 

1.3  Lessons Learned: Policies for Sustainable Development  

1.3.1  National Economic Development  

Economic policies have played a central role in Indonesia's institutional development.  The New 

Order government pursued the main objective of economic growth in an attempt to alleviate 

poverty and secure Indonesia s economic future for development.  Consequently, the existing 

institutional structure, of which policy is a part, was built around creating incentives for economic 

growth.  The GOI s institutional development philosophy was based upon policies of maximizing 

export earnings from an abundant natural resources base, while providing incentives for import 

substitution to domestic producers.  The protection provided to domestic producers, along with 

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