level system in place in the areas visited, and in other areas discussed with agencies in Dar es

Salaam. This is based on registration of people in  affected areas   under three categories:

1.  people with no means to buy food, and 

unable to work

;

2.  people with no means to buy food, but 

able to work

; and

3.  people with means to 

buy food

.

The intention appears to be to provide group 1 with free food, group 2 with food for work, and group 3

with no food aid (or sometimes the opportunity to buy food from government stocks): clearly the

underlying principle is that only the destitute and helpless should receive free food aid. However, this

apparently logical and simple rule has in fact proved extremely problematic in practice, as discussed

in section 1.2., and it is recommended below that the Government of Tanzania should revise these

guidelines.

At the time of the study, UNDP support was being provided for the revision and expansion of

Tanzania's disaster management policy (and related institutional capacity), though no draft was yet

available of the proposed new policy.  A similar project was under way in Uganda (see section 2.1.b.),

and in Kenya a draft document on disaster management was under discussion between the

Government and UNDP.

1.1.c.

Institutional framework: decision makers and information sources

The key institutions in national level targeting decisions are represented in Figure 4.  On the

government side, the formal body responsible for co ordination of disaster relief is the 

Tanzania

Disaster Relief Committee (TANDREC)

, chaired by the Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister's

Office and composed of representatives appointed by relevant Ministers.  The committee is convened

by the chairman as and when necessary, and has the formal role of advising the President on the

declaration of emergencies.

The secretariat to TANDREC is the 

Disaster Relief Co ordination Department (DRCD)

 in the PMO.

On paper, this department has core responsibility for the operational management of disaster

response, collection of information, and co ordination of relief implemented by government,

international and non government agencies. In the recent past, however, the DRCD has been

institutionally weak and appears to have had little active involvement in relief management.  From

October 1997 (during a crucial period of needs assessment and relief planning) the effective staff of

the Department was reduced to two people.  At the time of the study, however, the Department was in

a state of transition, with new staff (under a new Director),  specialist training and material support

provided under the UNDP project mentioned above, and plans to relocate to a more centrally 

positioned office.  For the future, the Department expects to be a more effective player in disaster

management.

During 1997, perhaps the most important role of the DRCD was as the chair and convenor of the

Food Emergency Sub Committee (FESC)

8

, formed under the authority of TANDREC to address

the specific issues of food aid needs assessment and distribution. This sub committee included WFP

(as secretariat) and all the NGOs authorized to distribute food aid. It seems to have been an important

forum for the exchange of information between government, UN and NGO sources, the planning of

joint assessment missions, and the formulation of targeting decisions (though it did not have power to

actually make such decisions).  Formal membership of the Sub Committee is quite restricted and

requires application to the PMO: however, observers can be invited (during 1997, for example, SCF

staff and USAID's Food Aid Monitor attended as observers). The DAC Food Group meetings, co 

ordinated by WFP and including FEWS as well as NGOs, were another important forum for the

exchange of information and the planning of assessments. 

 It is RECOMMENDED that in future

food emergencies, assuming a similar committee structure exists, both FEWS and the FSD

6

Early Warning Unit should seek invited status at appropriate meetings of the FESC.  

This would

help to ensure that best use is made of all available information, as early as possible in the decision 

making process.

8

   The name of this committee was sometimes given as  Food Sub Emergency Committee  or  Emergency Food

Sub Committee .

A 2