The 

distribution mechanism

 for EMOP 5989 was overwhelmingly free distribution, with targeting

relying on administrative selection at area and household level.  This was decided partly because

the scale and apparent urgency of the emergency did not allow adequate planning and

management of alternative mechanisms such as FFW (the earlier, smaller scale relief operation

5825 had successfully channeled some food aid through NGO's with established FFW capacity).

Another factor, commonly found in relief operations, was that no funds were available for non food

costs of  FFW.   WFP introduced both FFW and school feeding as Quick Action Projects 

after  

the

emergency period, for a more limited area and with more planning time.

The definition of the target group had already been decided by government directives as described

above and in section 1.2.c. below. However, WFP encouraged distributing NGOs to focus on

household rather than individual criteria,  to focus on the neediest only (excluding people able to

earn or buy food), and to distribute directly to women as household representatives and food

managers.

At the beginning of the emergency operation, USAID considered supplying sorghum rather than

maize, as a self targeting element in free distribution (since sorghum is less preferred, lower value

if sold, and less saleable since there is a limited market for it).  However, the final decision was to

supply maize because it was more easily diverted to other programs (such as refugee operations)

if the full quantity of the EMOP appeal was not needed for distribution in Tanzania.  This issue of

fungibility is a factor which frequently limits the use of commodity choice as a targeting element in

relief operations.

Market responses

 were much less effective in meeting drought induced food shortages in

Tanzania than in Kenya (see Appendix 3).  Although the GoT (like its neighbors) waived import

duties on maize, domestic prices remained below import parity so that it was not profitable for

traders to import. Very little food was therefore brought in commercially.  It is disputed how far this

can be explained by the effect of non tariff barriers to trade, how far by lack of effective purchasing

power in the worst hit areas (combined with poor and therefore expensive transport infrastructure),

and how far it can be taken as evidence that there were, overall, sufficient stocks of food in the

country to fill most of the harvest deficit.  Government restrictions on the export of maize may also

have distorted price signals and created local shortages in some areas (such as parts of Arusha,

discussed below).

1.2.b.  Government food aid

The Strategic Grain Reserve (managed by the FSD) buys, stores and sells maize in non 

emergency years. In emergencies, it is also drawn on for government relief distributions.

Decisions on relief and commercial releases of grain are separate: relief allocations are made by

TANDREC with the PMO, in response to Regional reports, while releases of food onto the market

are under the management of the Ministry of Agriculture (the FSD at national level, and the

Regional / District Agricultural Officers at the depots).

Relief distributions from the SGR were started early (in March 1997), and were targeted through

the District administrations and Village Committees.  The quantities distributed were quite

significant: Table 7 shows that relief allocations from March to July 1997 alone totaled nearly

15,000 MT (about half as much as was later  distributed under the WFP EMOP). Unfortunately

distribution figures for the whole year were not available (and the proportional allocation to each

Region later in the year, when conditions worsened, may not be reflected in these early figures). 

12

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 Some quantities of maize were later borrowed from the SGR by WFP, which could also lead to double 

counting of relief distributions: the overlaps are not clear from the limited data collected here.

A 9