Table 7:  Tanzania ~ Regional allocations from the Strategic Grain Reserve

March  July 1997  (MT)

Relief food

Commercial food

Total

(for free

(for sale)

Regional allocation

Region

distribution)

March July

(relief + commercial)

March June

ARUSHA

1,972

14

1,986

COAST

931

24,739

25,670

DODOMA

700

1,155

1,855

IRINGA

107

60

167

KAGERA

1,011

0

1,011

KILIMANJARO

1,900

7,089

8,989

LINDI

1,076

1,064

2,140

MARA

1,044

2,840

3,884

MOROGORO

321

2,591

2,912

MWANZA

1,325

0

1,325

SHINYANGA

1,141

0

1,141

SINGIDA

800

2,070

2,870

TABORA

400

1,659

2,059

TANGA

1,951

2,713

4,664

TOTAL

14,678

45,995

60,673

Source: FSD (via FEWS Tanzania

)

Note: figures for SGR allocations after July 1997 were not available at the time of the study

While relief distributions from SGR stocks were allocated to areas by TANDREC / PMO based on

perceived need, the commercial releases in each Region seem to have been determined mainly

by local market conditions. Where SGR prices were below market prices, large quantities were

sold (for example in the Coast Region during the period shown here).  In Shinyanga Region, on

the other hand, the Table shows that no commercial releases were taken up between March and

July, although in September FEWS reported that this was one of the few places where SGR stocks

were still being sold, because the private sector price was higher at that time than SGR's.   Prices

are not set nationally, but by each Region or depot. In the time available, the study team was not

able to determine the details of how or on what basis this was done: in Arusha (for example) the

SGR price was reported to have been significantly below the market level in the latter part of 1997.

In Arusha Region at least (according to the Regional Planning Officer) commercial SGR releases

were area targeted: that is, traders were issued a license to buy government food for delivery and

sale to specified needy areas, on presentation of credentials from the relevant District authorities

who would then verify that the food had been sold in the right place.  It was very difficult to

determine how well this worked: comments from villagers suggested that this food may not have

reached the most vulnerable areas, and within communities may only have benefited those who

would have been able to buy food anyway.  (In the areas visited, maize was available on the

market throughout the crisis, though at high prices).

The SGR commercial grain releases were the only example of direct market targeting (i.e.

manipulating the market supply and price of the staple cereal to influence access to food by target

areas or groups) found during the study.  FEWS price monitoring shows that such releases did, as

expected, cause a drop in food prices and elicit further supplies (from traders' stocks) onto the

market in some areas.  However, the targeting impact of these operations, and of the local area 

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