Further implementation problems with the three category registration system were raised in

Arusha: firstly, it led to the registration of the entire population of listed villages (since everyone

falls in one or other of the categories), which in turn raised expectations that everyone would be

eligible for some sort of assistance.  When this did not materialize, District and Regional offices

were besieged by local leaders lobbying for the quantities of aid they had been led to expect.

Some people in the villages visited clearly suspected that the food must have been diverted

somewhere along the line.  Village and Ward leaders, meanwhile, were told by District authorities

that they would have to cut their beneficiary lists in line with the quantities of aid actually received,

but without being given any guidance or support in how to do this.  In cases where the District

authorities themselves were directly responsible for distribution, their extremely limited transport

resources meant that supplies tended to  stick  at the District headquarters.  This not only delayed

distributions, but led to situations where villages with active and well informed leaders and enough

money to hire a truck would come to collect their own allocations, while more remote and poorer

communities were unable to do so, thus distorting the normal priorities in area targeting.  Overall,

the impression was that the whole operation had been a headache for local government,

especially for the District administrators caught in the middle.  Many of these problems could be

avoided by changing the assessment and registration process, so that realistic 

area targeting is

done first

 (before registering village populations), and clear information on the actual quantities to

be delivered to a given area is provided to leaders and communities before they are asked to

prioritize beneficiaries.

In one area visited (Simanjiro), local leaders had interpreted the third registration category (those

able to buy food) to mean that they could sell part of the food aid received to raise funds for

community work such as school repairs. In practice this had (not surprisingly) led to the better off

benefiting more than the poor from highly subsidized food aid sales, and to suspicions and

conflicts about the actual use of the proceeds.  Even if the intended use of funds was entirely

honest, this was presumably not the intention of the policy guideline.

As in Dodoma, the registration of people  able to work  was not connected to any actual plan for

food for work programs, except in some limited areas where NGOs were already operating

development programs and were able to organize small scale FFW  (eg TCRS and World Vision).

Given all these problems, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the GoT revise its directives on the

9

registration of food aid beneficiaries,  so that local authorities have clear instructions to

take account of household rather than individual circumstances, and to identify only those

areas and people 

unable to cope

 with the impacts of drought

(or other disasters) rather

than listing everyone 

`affected'

.

One further issue in Arusha which does not fall directly under the heading of food aid targeting but

which was very important in the management and interpretation of the perceived food crisis, was

government restriction of the grain trade.  Apparently intended by the central government as a ban

on exports across the Kenyan border (to conserve domestic supplies),  this led in Arusha to the

banning of trade between Districts as the Regional government tried to stop food flowing towards

the national border.  There is no doubt that this not only distorted price signals, making the

situation look worse than it was in some places, but actually caused acute local food shortages in

some areas (such as Arumeru) which would otherwise have expected no serious problems.

1.3.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED TARGETING

Recommendations have already been made above on the participation of FEWS and FSD Early

Warning representatives in meetings of the  Food Emergency Sub Committee; the need to study

the targeting impacts of SGR commercial operations; the development of TORs for Village Relief

Committees; and the revision of government directives on the three category registration of

A 14