drought affected populations as a basis for beneficiary targeting.   Further suggested actions for

improved food aid targeting in Tanzania are discussed below.

Sections 1.1. and 1.2.  have highlighted some key gaps and weaknesses in the national level

information available for targeting decisions during 1997/ 1998. At the time of the study, the

multilateral Food and Agriculture Sector Working Group (FASWOG) was already considering the

scope for improvement of agricultural production statistics, and FAO had commissioned a

consultant to assess the data needs for agriculture [Kiregyera 1997, ref. 24].  One relatively

inexpensive option under discussion is to fund the transmission of agricultural data from the

District agriculture offices, where it tends to get delayed due to lack of resources for

communications, to the central Ministry.

Although more timely and accurate production estimates are important for development planning

and would be a useful input to Stage 1 targeting, they would not in themselves solve the targeting

problem, which to some extent could be described as an 

analysis gap

 rather than a data gap.  An

overly narrow focus on local grain crop shortfalls (particularly maize and beans), without  the

framework of a  holistic assessment of vulnerability and coping capacity (which would include the

relative importance of cereals and other food sources, as well as trade,  purchasing power  from

cash crops or non agricultural activities, and other economic parameters) was a key factor in the

initial over estimate of the food aid needs in some areas.  While WFP and its implementing

partners did their best to re balance the picture with supplementary information, a more systematic

analysis of the full food security situation, within the government information system, would provide

a more solid basis for Stage 1 targeting in future.

In order to achieve this, some broadening and decentralization of the Early Warning System is

needed.  By `broadening', what is meant is that the full context of food security in vulnerable areas

must be assessed both in baseline vulnerability analysis and in the selection and interpretation of

monitoring indicators.  This will require some decentralization, since indicators of overall

vulnerability, food security, and coping capacity (unlike quantities of maize production) cannot be

standardized  to national level.  For example, the factors affecting people's ability to cope with the

impacts of the 1997 drought were quite different in Coast and Arusha regions, and within Arusha

were again quite different between pastoralist and farming areas.   Central capacity (in the FSD) to

collate and comparatively analyse information on these different economic areas remains crucial

(see the experience in Kenya in Appendix 3, and general discussion in Chapter 2), but  the

collection and initial interpretation must be done at decentralized,  ideally District,  level.

To be affordable, it is 

RECOMMENDED that decentralization of early warning should focus on

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selected Districts which are known to be food insecure and vulnerable to the impacts of

shocks such as drought, and where possible should build on the training and skills transfer

already initiated by some NGOs

 (such as the Oxfam / SCF workshops mentioned above).   The

institutional arrangements for achieving this will need to be developed in country, but it is

suggested that the early warning function remain in the Ministry of Agriculture structures, given the

established position of the FSD and the ongoing decentralization of the Ministry.  

If funding can

be obtained,  an Early Warning Officer should be appointed and trained in each selected

vulnerable District

.

At the national level, FEWS is already working jointly with the FSD to integrate a wider range of

food security indicators and analysis into the existing Early Warning system.  

It is

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RECOMMENDED that priority continue to be given to FEWS  capacity building and

collaborative work with FSD to broaden the analytical scope of the Early Warning System at

national level.

Collaborative work has also been initiated with the wider institutional community under the Food

Security Task Force started in February 1998.  Under this umbrella, FEWS has been working with

SCF UK, WFP's VAM office and FSD on the potential for joint vulnerability assessment work and

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