2.2.

TARGETING DURING THE 1997/8 DROUGHT & FLOOD EMERGENCIES

2.2.a. Overview

Signs of a drought induced food shortage developing in Eastern Uganda were reported by FEWS

as early as November 1996 (see Table 9), following two successive poor farming seasons whose

effect was intensified by a longer term process of increasing vulnerability.  Much of the limited local

harvest in the East was reportedly traded cross border to Uganda's drought hit neighbors, Kenya

and Tanzania, where prices were higher: but in January 1997 FEWS reported that this normal

direction of trade had been reversed, and maize was moving from Kenya into Eastern Uganda due

to increasing food scarcity there.

While it was clear that there was a problem developing, and that the drought was concentrated in

the (agricultural) East and (pastoralist) North East, it was extremely difficult to quantify the food

deficit or the need for assistance. Given the weakness of information systems outlined above, it is

not surprising  that  little  data  or  analysis  was  available  on  which  to  base  these  decisions.

As WFP commented in its EMOP proposal,  estimated needs were derived from national,

aggregate production data which was found highly inaccurate and which masked variances at the

micro, village and household level.  [WFP EMOP 5833 Project Document, ref 72].

In this situation, assessment missions became the most important information source for area

(Stage 1 and 2) targeting decisions.  The first FAO/WFP Crop and Food Needs Assessment

Mission to Uganda,  conducted in February 1997, estimated that up to 341,000 people in the East

and North East could need food aid due to drought impacts (in addition to continuing conflict 

displaced and refugee relief needs).  A GoU Inter ministerial assessment team the following month

put the figure at 1.2 million.   In April, a joint GoU / WFP/ FAO/ MSF / FEWS assessment mission

tried to fill some of the information gaps by assessing factors such as household stocks, coping

mechanisms, consumption of seed, self rationing (reduction in the number of meals), school and

clinic attendance, sale of livestock and other assets, and increased social tensions (indicated by a

rising crime rate).  Their report estimated the population needing food aid at 800,000, and it was

for this number of people that the Government appealed for aid on 21 April, at the same time

suspending all taxes on the import and local purchase of relief supplies.

WFP responded quickly to the Government appeal with an interim, small scale relief allocation

from the Director's discretionary fund, while planning a full scale Emergency Operation (EMOP

5833) [ref 72]. Between June and September 1997, a total of approximately 1,300 MT of cereals

and pulses (roughly 10% of the quantity originally planned) was distributed under the heading of

this EMOP, but  the full relief plan was never officially put into operation. By September, the rains

(though late) had started, and it was clear that a full scale food emergency had not materialized.

Then in November, the El Nino  rains brought flooding and landslides in the East, and different

relief needs.  Assessing the drought relief operation, WFP commented:

 The target area of ten districts was very large and beneficiaries wide spread. Only 10%

of budgeted food was approved thus distribution of the commodities was over spread to

cover more needy people. [Therefore] . except in hospitals where special feeding

programmes were implemented as planned, the general feeding was ineffective . [WFP

1998c, ref 77]

Further factors which raised concerns about the local (Stage 2 and 3) targeting of this operation

were the weak capacity of local government to manage food aid, and the effects of Local Council

elections in late 1997.

Flood impacts in Uganda due to El Nino  were very limited in area and impact, as discussed below

in the example of Mbale District.

A 21