government system does, however, include the development of national policy on drought

management [ALRMP 1996, ref 84].   It was not clear whether this is intended to include guidelines

on the use of food aid.

3.1.c.

Institutional framework: decision makers and information sources

Kenya has a more complex and diverse institutional context for national level targeting decisions

than its neighbors. This is partly because (as represented in Figure 8) there were almost entirely

separate decision making chains for government and international food aid during the drought

relief operations. The response to the flood disaster of late 1997/98, however,  was much more

closely co ordinated (see section 3.2.a.).

The central government structures for food aid allocation and disaster management in general

appear somewhat top heavy, with high level oversight from the 

National Food Security

Committee 

(chaired by the President or the Minister of State in the Office of the President) and

the inter ministerial 

National Disaster Management Co ordinating Committee 

(at Permanent

Secretary level), but with weak capacity at technical levels for co ordination and particularly for

information processing.   The logistical rapid response capacity of the government system was

greatly strengthened with the formation of a

 National Disaster Operations Center (NOC)  

under

the Office of the President in January 1998.  The NOC played an effective role in the relief

response to the El Nino  floods, and later the Nairobi bomb disaster.  However, the NOC is not

designed or equipped to fill the continuing gap in the co ordination of information and response to

slow onset

 disasters (primarily drought).  This gap is expected to be filled in the near future by the

National Drought Management Secretariat currently being developed under the DPIRP/ ALRMP

mandate.

Also in the

 Office of the President (OP)

,

under the

 Department of Relief and Rehabilitation

(reporting to the Permanent Secretary for Development Co ordination), is the  

National Famine

Relief Co ordinator's Office 

(NFRC).  This office is responsible for the procurement of

government relief food through the 

National Cereals and Produce Board

 (

NCPB

), and delivery

to the targeted Districts.  The NFRC also acts as liaison with donors on relief matters, and

represents the GoK at WFP monthly meetings and other fora.

It was not entirely clear to the study team whether decisions on how much food should be sent to

which Districts were actually made in the NFRC's Office, or by the higher level committees to

which he reports.  However, these decisions were said to be primarily influenced by reports and

requests channeled through the government administrative hierarchy from the Districts to the

Office of the President.  

District Social Dimensions of Development Committees

 (formerly

District Relief Committees) are the most important source of such information [interview with the

National Famine Relief Co ordinator].  Political lobbying on behalf of various constituencies also

reportedly plays a part, though this is difficult to quantify.  The prioritization of Districts during the

1996/7 drought relief operation is discussed further in section 3.2.b.

Where 

international

  food aid was concerned, the monthly  

WFP / GoK / NGO / Donor meetings

organized by WFP (and attended by FEWS) were a key forum for formulating and communicating

targeting decisions under the drought relief operation (EMOP 5803).  These decisions drew on

multiple sources of information, as outlined below.

The UNDP office in Kenya has played an active role in co ordinating assessments, liaising with the

GoK, mobilizing donors,  and promoting disaster preparedness.

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