Food aid is not the first response sought by this monitoring system, but a last resort. The

primary focus is on District level response where possible, and on prevention or development

measures in preference to relief.

The ALRMP / DPIRP system is inevitably better established in some Districts than others, and is

not yet functioning perfectly (bulletins are sometimes delayed and data is not always easily

available), but it is very much better than any alternative system available.  Its main weakness so

far, from the point of view of food aid targeting, lies not in the quality or relevance of the

information collected but in its 

use

.   At the national level,  while the District Bulletins have high

credibility among the international community (and are regularly used by FEWS), links to decision 

makers within the government system are weak.  Although the ALRMP / DPIRP headquarters are,

institutionally, within the OP like the NFRC, it is not clear that their information had any influence

on Government targeting of Districts during 1997/98.   These problems are recognized and are

currently being addressed, as part of the institutionalization of EW within the government system,

through the planned formation of a National Drought Monitoring Secretariat which will act as an

information and co ordination unit at the central level [interviews with the ALRMP Deputy National

Project Co ordinator and the DPIRP Early Warning Adviser].

At the District level,  ALRMP / DPIRP information is used for development project planning through

the District Steering Committee formed for this purpose in the Districts covered by the drought 

monitoring system.  However, it does not appear to be used for the targeting of government relief

within the Districts, which is managed separately by the District Social Dimensions of Development

Committee. It is therefore 

RECOMMENDED that drought monitoring information should be

22

systematically used for government relief targeting at District level (by the DSDDC) as well

as for development project planning (by the DSG).

  A  first step towards this would be the

inclusion of the drought monitoring officer in the Social Dimensions of Development (or Relief)

Committee.

At the national level, it is also 

RECOMMENDED that donor support for the proposed

23

partnership to sustain the DPIRP drought monitoring system could  significantly contribute

to improved information use in both government and international targeting decisions 

[see

Halderman 1997, ref 110].

WFP

 Kenya had not yet established its 

VAM

 office at the time of the study, but during the 1997/8

relief operations it supplemented field reports from its own monitors and implementing partners

with two additional information sources. Firstly, two SCF Food Economy

assessments (of Kitui and

Wajir) helped to inform area targeting decisions during the latter part of the drought relief

operation. Secondly, a short term Food Security Adviser was brought in to assist with the targeting

of the flood relief in mid 1998 (see section 3.2.a.).

NGOs were also an important source of food security information on their operational areas,

though this was largely unco ordinated.  Apart from Oxfam's community monitoring in Wajir, which

was generally agreed to have influenced the quantity of food aid allocated to the District by DFID

and WFP, it did not appear that  NGO information had been systematically used for national level

targeting decisions during the drought.   Oxfam launched an initiative in February 1997 for NGOs

to agree a format to standardize and disseminate their qualitative reporting, but this does not seem

to have been put into operation. Information from several NGOs (notably CARE, CRS, GTZ,

KFFHC, MSF, and Oxfam) does, however, appear regularly in FEWS bulletins.  In mid 1998,

during the re targeting of relief for flood victims, NGOs involved in the distributions were brought

together by WFP to work on area targeting, as discussed in the following section.

A 33