related to poverty and coping capacity.  In communities which were completely cut off from market

supplies of food, even the relatively rich could starve.  In fact, it appears that communities

themselves prioritized the neediest with a larger share of the blanket distribution, at least in some

cases [Jaspars 1998a, ref 112, and village informants in Garissa].  Not surprisingly, the

distributions at beneficiary level were managed in different ways by different NGOs and

communities, so that there was no uniform method.

In June / July, WFP engaged a short term expert to advise on the targeting of the flood EMOP for

the third phase (July to September 1998).  After consultations, field assessments and a workshop

involving NGO partners,  her reports [Jaspars 1998, refs 112, 113, 114, 115 and 116] include the

following points:

  the initial area targeting of EMOP 5969 was based largely on where NGO partners were

already on the ground distributing drought relief;

  the estimated numbers of beneficiaries were either total District population, or people

registered for drought relief, or negotiated figures;

  nutrition surveys (on which area targeting was in theory to be based) were not co ordinated

and used different methodologies (some of which were questionable). There was no national

guideline for such surveys (although nutritional status information seems to be frequently used

for relief planning in Kenya); and

  the allocation of different ration rates to different Districts was not rational, as food security

conditions were unlikely to change at District boundaries.

Jaspars' recommendations for the third phase of EMOP 5969 were to revise the unit of targeting,

dividing Districts into livelihood zones (see below) rather than administrative Divisions,  and to

make blanket distributions to the population of the targeted zones at two different ration rates:

100% for areas with acute food needs and malnutrition, and 50% for areas where the food aid was

primarily for recovery.

 Livelihood zones  are similar in concept to the  food economy areas  used in SCF s Food

Economy Assessment (FEA) methodology   i.e. they are geographical areas within which people

share the same major sources of food and income.  Jaspars' approach is more  quick and dirty 

than the SCF methodology, as it draws mainly on the existing knowledge of NGOs rather than key 

informant field research, and does not include household level or wealth group analysis.  Its aim is

to define coherent economic areas for relief targeting.  In practice, the ability of WFP's partner

NGOs to map the livelihood zones in their areas was varied. Oxfam was able to do it in some

detail for Wajir, mainly because they had a great deal of knowledge of the District and had already

done something very similar.  CARE (for example) had less confidence in the map produced of

livelihood zones in Garissa.  Further problems arose with implementation, as it was felt that giving

relief to some zones and not to others in the Districts concerned could lead to clan warfare.  It

would be interesting to know how far the zones were actually used as targeting units.

A useful side effect of the targeting workshop organized by Jaspars [August 1998, see ref. 115] is

that it seems to have raised NGO awareness of the influence that timely and well directed

information can have on the levels of relief resources allocated to different areas.

Market responses

 were important in the Kenyan drought.  Like its East African neighbors, the

GoK waived maize import taxes as part of  its emergency response (in February 1997, and again

in June 1998 after the floods). In contrast to Tanzania, the domestic price was high enough and

the liberalized private sector active enough to bring in substantial quantities of grain, which

undoubtedly stabilized prices to some extent and greatly mitigated the potential food shortages

(thus reducing the need for relief).

A 38