(possibly among the staff of  the Applied Nutrition Program in the University of Nairobi)

who could be deployed when needed to provide technical training, familiarization with the

new guideline (once agreed), back up and standardization for NGOs.

  The development of

such guidelines and back up capacity should be seen as an important  disaster preparedness

measure. The most appropriate institutions to take this forward would presumably be the Ministry

of Health with UNICEF and WFP.

ALRMP

 monitoring  (in all the arid  Districts covered by ALRMP / DPIRP) includes a rapid

assessment of nutritional status (using MUAC measurement) in its regular monthly monitoring.

This identifies areas with worrying nutritional trends which can then be followed up by a more

thorough assessment, and was considered very useful by the NGO and UN informants

interviewed.   Garissa appears to be the District where ALRMP is least well established so far:

problems with access to data and late reporting were mentioned by potential users. During the

flood crisis, monitoring was unavoidably halted due to the impossibility of reaching the

communities.  As far as the study team could establish,  ALRMP information had not been used

either by the government or by WFP / UNICEF and their partners for targeting relief within the

District.

For the 

general free distributions

 by both WFP and government, beneficiary (Stage 3) targeting

was left to communities. The District Commissioner commented that local leaders were instructed

to give the government food to the needy, but that the clans had their own way of distribution.  In

WFP / NGO areas it was noted that village committees in the Northern Divisions tended to share

food aid equally among everyone, while in the south they gave some food to everyone but with

larger shares for the needy.  At CARE's Masabubu Distribution Center  in Bura Division the Food

Distribution Committee (six men and four women chosen by the community) explained that, apart

from business people and civil servants who did not claim aid,  everyone in the community had

received something out of the flood relief food.  Larger rations had been given to the old, disabled,

orphans and generally those with no one to care for them.  The committee also commented that

some people who still had livestock had voluntarily given part of their rations to these vulnerable

groups.

In comparing the 

flood relief operation

 to drought relief, three major points arose from

discussions:

  Access and logistics were a huge problem in the flood response, so much so that area

targeting in practice depended mainly on accessibility during the acute phase of the crisis.

Some areas could not even be reached by air drop as there was no dry land on which to drop

supplies.

  Poverty and coping capacity were of little relevance to people's relief needs, in areas where

food stocks and access to markets had been swept away.

Unlike a drought situation,  food was only one of several urgent needs, others being water and

sanitation, shelter, and medicines.

Differences between the targeting of flood and drought relief are discussed in general in Chapter 2.

An issue raised both by the District Commissioner and NGO / UN informants is the problem of

commodity choice

. Since the Somali people of Garissa do not normally eat maize (which is the

grain most often available as food aid), a large proportion of food aid is sold in exchange for other

foods (rice and pasta, which need less fuel and water for cooking, being the preferred staples).

As one of the reasons for proposing Cash for Work in Garissa in place of food aid, CARE

comments:

 During free food distributions or FFW, people sell a proportion of the food to buy other

food and necessary items. This food is sold at a much lower price   often less than a fifth

of what it cost to get the food to them. CFW omits the need for this wasteful transaction

and allows people to purchase what they need.   .. [Also] it is easier and quicker to

establish than FFW .

[CARE Kenya 1998, ref 90].

A 46